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11. Introduction
Nash (1953) considers a scenario in which two players may choose
their strategies independently, but in which contractual enforcement
is available both for strategic agreements the two players may come
to, and for threats each player makes about what she will do if agree-
ment is not reached. Nash gives two analyses of this problem, and
shows that the two solutions coincide. One builds upon Nash (1950)
in giving an axiomatic treatment, while the other devises what is
now called a ￿Nash demand game￿whose payo⁄s are perturbed to
yield a unique re￿ned Nash equilibrium payo⁄ pair. Carrying out
this dual axiomatic/noncooperative approach to strategic problems
with contracts is what has been dubbed ￿the Nash program￿ .
This paper attempts to implement the Nash program in a broad
class of two-player stochastic games. Leaving behind the static world
of Nash (1953), it admits problems in which the state of the world
(for example, ￿rms￿marginal costs, capital stocks, inventories and
so on) may evolve over time, perhaps in￿ uenced by the players￿
actions. Like a game without state variables, a stochastic game
with contracts is, in essence, a bargaining problem. One wants to
know how players are likely to divide the surplus a⁄orded by their
stochastic environment.
Since the passage of time is crucial in a stochastic game, whereas
it plays no role in Nash (1953), it is not immediately clear how to
2do an exercise in the spirit of Nash in these dynamic settings. For
this reason, we begin in Section 2 by recasting the atemporal game
of Nash as a strictly repeated discounted game. At the beginning
of each period, players select actions for that period, and have an
opportunity to bargain over how to split the surplus for the rest of
the in￿nite-horizon game. If agreement is not reached in period 1,
there is another opportunity to bargain in period 2, and so on. All
stationary perfect equilibria of the intertemporal game approach (as
slight stochastic perturbations as in Nash (1953) tend to zero) the
same division of surplus as the static Nash bargaining with threats
(NBWT) solution. The result is independent of the rate of interest.
After the stochastic game model is introduced in Section 3, Sec-
tion 4 develops the proposed solution for a broad class of these
games. At the heart of the analysis is a family of interlocking Nash
bargaining problems. With each state ! is associated a bargaining
set (the convex hull of the set of all pairs of expected present dis-
counted values of strategy pro￿les for the game starting in !) and a
disagreement point. The disagreement point is determined partly by
the ￿threat￿actions played in !, and partly by the solution values of
possible successor states of !. The solution value at ! is generated
by the feasible set and disagreement point at ! by the maximiza-
tion of the ￿Nash product￿just as it is in Nash (1950, 1953). At
least one solution (giving action pairs and value pairs in each state)
3exists, and we give su¢ cient conditions for all solutions to have the
same value pair starting at state !: call this value pair V ￿(!).
Consider perturbing the game G so that it is not perfectly pre-
dictable whether a given pair of demands is feasible at !. Section
5 establishes that all Markov perfect equilibrium payo⁄s have the
same limit as the perturbation approaches 0; for the game starting
at !, this limit equals V ￿(!), the solution value suggested by the
family of NBWT problems from the preceding paragraph.
Thus, the solution V ￿(!) has been given a noncooperative in-
terpretation. Section 6 demonstrates that, applying the axiomatic
approach of Nash (1953) to the family of NBWT problems of Sec-
tion 3, one gets unique predictions of how surplus will be divided
starting in any state !. Showing that this prediction coincides with
V ￿(!) completes the Nash program for stochastic games.
Given the ￿ exibility of the stochastic game model, applications
of the solution are almost limitless. Section 7 sketches one example
that illustrates the ability of a relatively weak competitor to extort
surplus from a stronger party.
Section 8 concludes, and relates the results to ongoing work on
reputationally perturbed stochastic games.
2. Strictly Repeated Games
4This Section translates the noncooperative treatment Nash (1953)
gives his bargaining problem, from his static setting to a station-
ary, in￿nite-horizon environment. Making assumptions analogous
to those of Nash, we derive identical results regarding the propor-
tions in which surplus is divided, and the actions that should be
employed as threats.
Nash takes as exogenous a ￿nite game G = (S1;S2;U1;U2) in strate-
gic form (with associated mixed strategy sets M1 and M2) and a
bargaining set B ￿ R2. The set of feasible payo⁄s of G, namely
￿ = cofu(s) : s 2 Sg (where co denotes "convex hull of"), represents
all the payo⁄s players can attain without cooperation (ignoring in-
centives). The set B includes all payo⁄s available to players through
cooperation, that is, through enforceable contracts. Nash assumes
that B is convex and compact, and that ￿ ￿ B. The interpretation
is that if players are willing to cooperate, they may be able to attain
payo⁄combinations not possible from playing G. (For example, if a
couple are willing to sign a marriage contract, they gain additional
legal rights and perhaps receive a tax break.)
For any arbitrary nonempty, compact, convex bargaining set X ￿
R2 and "threat point" or "disagreement point" d 2 X, N(d) denotes
the associated Nash bargaining solution. The latter is the unique
solution to maxx2B (x1 ￿ d1)(x2 ￿ d2) if there exists x 2 B such that
x ￿ d and otherwise uniquely satis￿es N(d) 2 X and N(d) ￿ x all
5x 2 X such that x ￿ d. Let the functions Vi : M1 ￿ M2 ! R be de￿ned
by Vi(m) = Ni(U(m)):
In the strategic setting described by (G;B) as in the preceding
paragraph, there is a bargaining set, but no exogenous threat point.
In constructing his proposed solution, Nash imagines that players
choose respective threats mi 2 Mi, i = 1;2; knowing that the Nash
bargaining solution will result (relative to the threat point (m1;m2)
and B). That is, he de￿nes the game b G = (M1;M2;V1;V2): Nash shows
that this game b G whose pure strategies are the mixed strategies of G,
has equilibria that are interchangeable and equivalent. Their value,
denoted v￿, is the Nash bargaining with threats (NBWT) solution.
Notice that the game b G is just a construction in the formulation
of the solution, NOT the noncooperative implementation of that
solution. The construction mixes the idea of Nash equilibrium with
the Nash product, which was justi￿ed axiomatically in Nash (1950).
To obtain an entirely strategic justi￿cation for his proposed so-
lution, free of any axiomatic assumptions, Nash devised a two-stage
game as follows. In the ￿rst stage, each player i simultaneously
chooses mi 2 Mi. Thus, the pure actions of the ￿rst stage game are
the mixed strategies of G. In the second stage, having observed the
actions (m1;m2) from the ￿rst stage, each player i makes a utility de-
mand ui. If the pair (u1;u2) is feasible in B, then it is implemented.
Otherwise, the utility pair received by the players is U(m1;m2), the
6threat point determined by ￿rst period choices. Since the threat pair
is typically NOT a Nash equilibrium of G, the players often have an
interest in not carrying it out; external enforcement is needed to
ensure that the threats are not abandoned ex post.
There is in general a great multiplicity of (subgame perfect) equi-
libria of the two-stage game, so Nash introduces random pertur-
bations to the feasible set, making players slightly unsure about
whether a given pair of demands would be feasible or not. This
allows him (after taking limits of sequences of equilibria, as the per-
turbations become vanishingly small) to isolate a particular equilib-
rium, whose value pair coincides with the feasible pair that maxi-
mizes the Nash product.
We follow Nash in assuming free disposal: if u 2 B and v ￿ u then
v is feasible. Let B+ = fv j v ￿ u for some u 2 Bg: In the unperturbed
problem, if players demand v = (v1;v2); the probability it is feasible
is 1 if v 2 B+ and 0 if v = 2 B+. In a perturbed game, a perturbation
function h speci￿es the probability that v will be feasible.
We consider perturbation schemes as de￿ned by probability func-
tions of the following form:
A perturbation is a function h: R2 ! [0;1] with
(i) h(v) = 1 if v 2 B+ and h(v) < 1 if v = 2 B+.
7(ii) h is continuously di⁄erentiable. Furthermore, h(v) 2 (0;1) )
hi(v1;v2) < 0:
We are interested in limits of SPEs of a sequence of perturbed
games, where the perturbation functions approach the unperturbed
game in a natural way.
Nash shows that there is only one equilibrium that survives all
local perturbations. It is unfortunately still possible that for any
particular perturbation, there may be many equilibria with dra-
matically di⁄erent values. This cannot be the case for any regular
perturbation, as de￿ned below.
A sequence of perturbations fhng1
n=1 is regular if:
(i) A compact and A \ B+ = ? ) 9 integer n s.t. v 2 A ) hn(v) = 0
8n ￿ n.







is the slope of the iso-probability line at v:
Let s(v) and s(v) be the supremum and in￿mum respectively of
slopes of supporting hyperplanes of B at v:
Let B
+ denote the boundary of B+:
8(ii) 8v 2 B
+
& 8" > 0; 9￿ > 0 & n s.t.
v0 2 Cn & jv0 ￿ vj < ￿ =)
s(v) ￿ " ￿  
n(v0) ￿ s(v) + "
The ￿rst condition imposes a uniformity on the way in which
points outside B are assigned certain infeasibility as n grows. The
second requirement is that asymptotically, the iso￿probability sets
must respect (approximately, for points near the frontier of B+) the
trade-o⁄s between players￿demands that are expressed in the slope
of the frontier of B+.
Let vi denote player i0s minmax payo⁄ in G:
To avoid some tedious quali￿cations in the proofs, we assume
that vi < bi, i = 1;2:
Recall that v￿ denotes the equilibrium payo⁄ pro￿le and let m￿
denote a pro￿le of mixed strategy equilibrium threats of the stan-
dard NBWT game associated with (G;B):
Let mj 2 Mj denote a strategy of j which minmaxes i 6= j.
Lemma 1 If v￿
i=bi then mj is an optimal strategy for j in the NBWT
game b G:
9Let m￿
j be an optimal strategy for j in the NBWT game b G and
furthermore equal to mj if v￿
i=bi:
Let bi be player i￿ s highest payo⁄ in B (or equivalently B+): For
b1 ￿ b1 let f2(b1) be the maximal corresponding value of b2 in B+ :
(b1; f2(b1)) 2 B+ and for all (b1;y) 2 B+; f2(b1) ￿ y: The function f1 is
de￿ned analogously.
Suppose for the moment that the two players have chosen threats
m1 and m2: Denote the resulting subgame, with perturbation func-
tion h, by ￿(m;h) (suppressing for the moment the game G and bar-
gaining set B that are being held ￿xed), and let V (m) be the Nash
bargaining solution for the problem with bargaining set B and dis-
agreement point U(m).
Even in a perturbed demand game, there may be degenerate equi-
libria in which each player i demands so much that if j 6= i demands
at least as much as his value at the threat point, the probability of
feasibility is zero. All our results are for equilibria that are nonde-
generate in this sense on all subgames.
Lemma 1 says that if Player i uses her NBWT equilibrium strat-
egy m￿
i as de￿ned earlier, then all nondegenerate equilibria of only
slightly perturbed demand games have values at least (almost) equal
10to v￿
i : Since v￿ is a strictly e¢ cient payo⁄, Proposition 1 below fol-
lows directly.
Lemma: Let fhng be a regular sequence of perturbations and
consider a threat pair m ￿ (m1;m￿
2). Then for any " > 0 there exists n
such that for all n ￿ n and any non-degenerate NE ￿n of the subgame
indexed by m;
U2 (￿n)￿ V 2(m) ￿ "
Proof :
Denote by vn
i Player i￿ s equilibrium demands in the subgame
indexed by m: If the conclusion is false then there must exist a
subsequence (for simplicity denote this also by n) converging to some
b v such that b v2 < V (m):We argue that this yields a contradiction.








1 + hn ￿ hn
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1 ￿ d1)hn
1 = ￿hn:
By the nondegeneracy assumption hn(vn) > 0: It follows that (vn
1 ￿
d1) > 0; and hn
1 < 0:















11It must be the case that b v lies on the upper boundary of B (de-
noted B): If b v = 2 B then for large n; hn(vn) = 0; contradicting the
nondegeneracy assumption. If b v 2 B and b v = 2 B then the optimality
of players￿choice of demands is contradicted for large n:










2) , the slope of the iso-probabality line at vn, satis￿es s(b v)￿
" ￿  
n(vn) ￿ s(b v) + ":
It follows that
b v2 ￿ d2
b v1 ￿ d1
= ￿s for some s 2 [s(b v);s(b v)]: By Nash (1950, 1953), if
b v is on the boundary of B and b v ￿ d then the preceding condition
is satis￿ed if and only if b v = V (m) (and consequently the conclusion
follows).
If d lies on the (strictly) e¢ cient frontier of B then b v = d and
d = b v = V (m):
Now suppose that d is not on the e¢ cient frontier of B and b v1 = d1
and b v2 = d2: Since, as argued above, b v 2 B; either b v2 = d2 = b2 or b v1 =
d1 = b1: In the former case we are done. In the latter, it follows that
v￿
1 = b1: But in this case we have de￿ned m￿
2 = m2 and consequently
d1 < b1 (as per our assumption that vi < bi, i = 1;2:): This yields a
contradiction.
In the above scenario if b v1 > d1 and b v2 = d2 then lim 
n(vn) ￿















): It follows that b v2 = d2 =
12b2; and again we are done. Finally suppose that b v1 = d1 and b v2 > d2:
Then lim 
n(vn) ￿ 1: It follows that b v1 = d1 = b1: But this yields a
contradiction as in the preceding paragraph.
Now consider the full two-stage game with perturbation func-
tion h in stage two; call this extensive game E(h). A nondegenerate
subgame perfect equilibrium of E(h) is an SPE of E(h) which in-
duces nondegenerate equilibria in every subgame following a choice
of threats. Proposition 1 says that the values of nondegenerate
SPE￿ s converge, as you move along a regular sequence of perturba-
tions, to the NBWT value v￿:
Proposition 1: Let fhng be a regular sequence of perturbations







Again Proposition 1 does something slightly di⁄erent from what
Nash (1953) shows, establishing convergence of ALL nondegener-
ate equilibria (along ANY regular sequence of perturbations). Nash
instead argues that only one equilibrium survives ALL nearby per-
turbations, and he admits a broader class of perturbation functions
13than we do. A second distinction is that Nash does the limit analysis
only in the second- stage game, using the limiting values to deter-
mine ￿rst-period behavior.
This completes our analysis of the static world of Nash (1953).
We turn now to the description of an in￿nite horizon model whose
Markovian SPE￿ s yield the same (limiting) results. In each period (if
agreement has not yet been reached), the two players play the per-
turbed two-stage game E(h) described earlier: each player i chooses
a threat mi from Mi, and having observed her opponent￿ s threat,
chooses a demand vi 2 R: With probability h(v); the demands are
feasible, and the game is essentially over: each player i receives vi in
each subsequent period. With complementary probability, the de-
mands are infeasible, and play proceeds to the next period. In every
period before agreement is reached the same perturbation function
h is used, but the draws are independent across time. Payo⁄s are
discounted at the rate of interest r > 0:
Notice that the utility pair U (m1;m2) serves as a temporary threat
point: it will determine the period-t payo⁄s if the demand pair is
infeasible. In contrast to Nash (1953), infeasibility causes a delay to
cooperation rather than irreversible breakdown.
We are interested in the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of the
repeated game. An MPE is a stationary subgame perfect equilib-
14rium in which neither player￿ s behavior in period t depends on the
history of actions or demands in earlier periods.
The proposition below is the analog of the result Nash (1953)
derives for his two-stage noncooperative game (in which a choice of
threats is followed by a Nash demand game). It proves that along
any sequence of perturbed games (and MPE￿ s thereof) with the
perturbations converging to 0, the demands made by the players
converge to the NBWT solution (Nash (1953). Thus, the repeated
game is an alternative to Nash￿ s original two-stage game as a setting
in which to give noncooperative expression to the NBWT solution.
Proposition 2: Let fhng be a regular sequence of perturbations
of the "repeated bargaining game" and f￿ng any sequence of corre-




An axiomatic foundation for the NBWT solution is easily given
in the repeated game setting of this section, but it is covered in the
more general treatment of Section 6.
3. The Stochastic Model
15In the stationary model of Section 2, the noncooperative game G
summarizes the payo⁄ pairs that are feasible (ignoring incentives),
and the bargaining set B speci￿es a weakly larger set of payo⁄s avail-
able to players if they sign binding contracts. This section speci￿es
the game and the bargaining sets (one for each state) for the sto-
chastic environment studied in Sections 4, 5 and 6.
The role of G will be played by G = (￿;Si(!);ui(:;!);￿(:;!;s(!));s(!) 2
S(!); ! 2 ￿; i = 1;2;!0;r); where ￿ is the ￿nite set of states, !0 is the
initial state, Si(!) is the ￿nite set of pure strategies available to
player i in state !, ui speci￿es i￿ s utility in any period as a func-
tion of the state ! prevailing in that period and the action pair
s 2 S(!) played in that period, ￿(!0:;!;s) is the probability that if
state ! prevails in any period t, and s is the action pair in S(!)
played in t; state !0 will prevail in period t + 1. Let Mi(!) be the





s22S2(!) ￿(!0;!;s)m1(s1;!)m2(s2;!). Finally r
is the strictly positive rate of interest at which both players discount
their in￿nite stream of payo⁄s.
The interpretation is that in period 1, each player i selects a strat-
egy from Si(!0) or from its associated mixed strategy set Mi(!0); and
the strategy pair results in an immediate payo⁄and a probability of
transiting to each respective state in period 2, and so on. Starting
in any period t and state ! one can compute the feasible (average)
16payo⁄s from t onward; let this set be denoted ￿(!):
Let B(!) denote the set of discounted average payo⁄s that the
players could attain from period t onward starting in state !; by
signing contracts. Just as Nash assumed ￿ ￿ B (see Section 2),
we assume for each ! that ￿(!) ￿ B(!) : contractual cooperation
can achieve anything that independent action can achieve. Further,
anything players can accomplish by acting independently today and
then signing contracts tomorrow, they can achieve today by simply
signing one contract today. Formally, we assume:
cof(1￿￿)u(m(!);!)+￿
P
!0 ￿(!0!;m(!))v(!0) s.t. m(!) 2 M(!);v(!0) 2
B(!0) all !0g ￿ B(!):
To establish uniqueness of a ￿xed point arising in the proposed
solution in Section 4, either of the following conditions is su¢ cient.
Eventual Absorption(EA): The set of states can be partitioned
into K classes ￿k, k = 1;:::;K such that ￿K is an absorbing set of
states and from any states in ￿k, k = 1;:::;K￿1; play can transit only
to states in ￿k0 for k0 > k.
Uniformly Transferable Utility(UTU): The e¢ ciency frontiers of
all B(!); ! 2 ￿ are linear and have the same slope.
17Because of the availability of long-term contracts, it is not crucial
to work with in￿nite-horizon stochastic games. Note that Eventual
Absorption places no restrictions whatever on ￿nite-horizon stochas-
tic games. Transferable utility is most plausible when players are
bargaining over something that is "small" relative to their overall
wealth.
We will refer to the game G and the collection of bargaining sets
B, as a stochastic bargaining environment.
4. The Proposed Solution
Here we develop a solution for stochastic games with contracts,
that will be given noncooperative and axiomatic justi￿cations, re-
spectively, in Sections 5 and 6. The goal is to formulate a theory that
explains players￿behavior in a state ! by analyzing the bargaining
situation they ￿nd themselves in at !.
What bargaining problem do players face at !, if they have not
yet signed a contract? The available strategies for player i are those
in Mi(!), and the bargaining set is B(!). We want to follow Nash by
maximizing the Nash product in B(!) relative to the disagreement
point. But if players choose the threat pair (m1;m2), the correspond-
ing one-period payo⁄ u(m(!)) is just the temporary disagreement
18point, familiar from Section 2. Taking a dynamic programming per-
spective, a player who observes that bargaining has failed today in
state ! expects that after getting u(m(!)) today, she will get the
value assigned by the solution to whatever state !0 arises tomorrow.
Thus, the dynamic threat point D(!;m) associated with threats m
and proposed value function v (:;m), is given by the formula:





which naturally depends on the rate of interest and on the en-
dogenous transition probabilities.
Notice the simultaneous determination of the values D(!;m)and
v (!0;m): we wish each v (!;m) to maximize the Nash product relative
to D(!;m), but at the same time D(!;m) is partly determined by the
v (!0;m). Thus, even holding ￿xed the threats m(!), ￿nding a solution
involves a ￿xed point calculation. The uniqueness of the ￿xed point
is guaranteed by either eventual absorption (EA) or by uniformly
transferable utility (UTU) (see section 3).
Lemma 1 Assume EA or UTU. Then for any (m1;m2) 2 M1 ￿ M2,
there exists a unique function V (￿;m1;m2) de￿ned on ￿, such that
for all ! 2 ￿; V (!;m1;m2) is the Nash bargaining solution to the
19bargaining problem (￿(!);D(!)); where




The above exercise was done for a ￿xed action pair. Now that
value consequences for action pairs are established, we can ask, for
each state !, what actions (threats, in Nash￿ s interpretation, 1953)
players would choose if they were in !: In other words, we imagine
players playing modi￿ed versions of G, where for state !, the payo⁄s
will be given by V (!;￿). This is called the threat game. It is indexed
by the "initial" state ! and is denoted .
b G (!)=(Mi;Vi (!;￿);i = 1;2)
Again, we mimic Nash in thinking of players in ! choosing m1
and m2, to maximize V1 (!;m) and V2 (!;m) respectively. This game￿ s
equilibria are interchangeable and equivalent, so it has a value v￿ (!):
We have:
Lemma 2 (Existence) There exists a pair (m￿
1;m￿
2) such that (m￿
1;m￿
2)
is an equilibrium of b G (!) for all ! 2 ￿:
Notice that in addition to existence, the lemma asserts a nice
time consistency property. Moreover,
20Lemma 3 Equilibria of b G (!) are equivalent and interchangeable.
Let the function v￿: ￿ ! R2 be de￿ned by v￿ (!) = V (!;m￿): This
is the proposed solution.
In the framework of Nash (1953), the pair (m￿
1;m￿
2) is the (state-
contingent) pair of threats associated with the stochastic game with
initial state !; and V (!;m￿
1;m￿
2) is the associated equilibrium value
pair. These may be viewed as generalizations of the NBWT solution
to stochastic environments.
5. Noncooperative Treatment
Section 4 developed a proposed solution for any stochastic game
that satis￿es "eventual absorption" or that has transferable utility.
Here we provide support for the proposed solution by doing a non-
cooperative analysis of the stochastic game in the spirit of Nash
(1953). As in Section 2, we perturb the demand game (in any state)
and study the equilibria as the perturbations become vanishingly
small. All Markovian equilibria have values in any state ! converg-
ing to v(!), the demand pair recommended by the proposed solution.
21Similarly, the limit points of any sequence of Markovian equilibrium
action pairs at ! (as perturbations vanish) are in the interchange-
able and equivalent set of temporary threat pairs at ! speci￿ed by
the proposed solution. In other words, a noncooperative perspective
points to the same state-contingent values and threat actions as the
proposed solution.
We begin by describing the (unperturbed) noncooperative game
to be analyzed. Based on the stochastic bargaining environment of
Section 3, it involves the bargainers playing a threat game, followed
by a demand game, in any period if no contract has yet been agreed
upon. In period 1, the state is !0; so each player i chooses a threat
x 2 Mi(!0). Having observed the threats, players make demands
(v1;v2). If (v1;v2) 2 B(!0), the rewards are enforced contractually and
the game is essentially over. Otherwise, the threat payo⁄is realized
in period 1, and the state transits to !0 with probability ￿(!0j!;x).
In period 2, threats are again chosen (from sets that depend on the
prevailing state), and so on.
This unperturbed game, denoted G, naturally has many perfect
Bayesian equilibria, so one looks at a sequence of perturbed games
approaching G. The nth element of the sequence is a stochastic
game in which feasibility of a demand pair (v1;v2) 2 B(!) is given by
hnw (v1;v2), where the outcomes are independent across periods. For
22any !, the perturbation function hnw satis￿es the same conditions as
in Section 3, and regularity of the sequence (with index n) is de￿ned
as before.
Before stating the convergence result precisely we provide some
rough intuition for the case of "eventual absorption" (with K classes
of states). In any absorbing state !; players are in the situation
covered by Section 2, where the "Nash bargaining with threats"
convergence results were established. If instead ! is in class K ￿ 1;
incentives are di⁄erent, both because the game in the current pe-
riod di⁄ers from the game to be played from tomorrow onward, and
because threats today a⁄ect the state transition matrix. But the
dynamic threat point de￿ned in the construction of the proposed
solution in Section 4 mimics these phenomena exactly, so conver-
gence to the generalized NBWT threats and demands (the proposed
solution) also occurs in these states. The same argument applies by
induction to all states.
Proposition: let fhn!g!;n be a regular sequence of perturbations
of the stochastic bargaining game and f￿ng any sequence of corre-


























The unique NBWT ￿xed point is characterized by:









Section 6. Cooperative Treatment
Nash (1953) gives us an axiomatic theory of how a bargaining
problem will be resolved. A bargaining problem consists of a non-
empty, compact and convex set B of feasible utility pairs, nonempty
￿nite sets S1 and S2 of pure strategies (or ￿threats￿ ) players can em-
ploy (they can mix over those pure strategies), and a utility function
24U mapping S1￿S2 into R2. A theory associates with each bargaining
problem a unique solution, an element of the feasible set. Nash pro-
poses a set of axioms such a theory should satisfy; he shows there
is exactly one theory consistent with this set.
At ￿rst glance, it would appear that a much more elaborate set of
axioms is required to address the complexities of a stochastic game
with contracts. But adopt the perspective of Section 4: the players
in the stochastic game beginning in state ! implicitly face a bargain-
ing problem. Their feasible set is the set of all present discounted
expected payo⁄ pairs they can generate by signing contracts today
concerning their actions in all contingencies. Their sets of threats
are the sets of actions available at !. How do the players evaluate a
pair of threats (m1;m2)? They get a ￿ ow payo⁄ pair U(m1;m2) until
the state changes and there is some new opportunity to bargain. At
that point, they have encountered a new bargaining problem (the
stochastic game beginning in some state !0), and the theory we are
trying to axiomatize says what players should get in that situation.
Since the pair (m1;m2) determines the arrival rates of transition to
other states, one can compute the expected discounted payo⁄ con-
sequences of (m1;m2) for each player.
To summarize, a theory assigns to each stochastic game with
contracts, a solution pair from its feasible set. If the players believe
the theory, these values determine a payo⁄ pair that players expect
25to result if they adopt a particular threat pair and agreement is not
reached. Analogues of Nash￿ s axioms can be applied directly to this
family of bargaining problems. The di⁄erence between this family
and that of Nash (1953) is that for Nash, the threat pair utilities are
fully speci￿ed by a pair of actions, whereas here they are partially
determined by the proposed theory, as explained in the preceding
paragraph. This gives rise to a ￿xed point problem. While we can
show existence in great generality, for uniqueness we assume either
transferable utility or eventual absorption, as in Sections 4 and 5.
A stochastic bargaining game G is de￿ned by a stochastic game
and a state-dependent bargaining set B(!) where ￿(!) ￿ B(!):
Fix ￿;￿. We may associate a variety of stochastic bargaining
environments E with the above ￿xed elements [By varying B(:)￿ s,
M￿ s, etc.]
De￿nition: A value v￿ for a stochastic bargaining environment E
speci￿es for each ! 2 ￿ a unique element v￿(!) 2 B(!).
De￿nition: A solution speci￿es a unique value for each E.
Axioms on Solution
1. Pareto optimality
2. Independent of Cardinal Representation.
Consider E and E0where E0 is identical to E except that for
some ai > 0 and bi; i = 1;2; utility values ui in E are transformed
26to
u0
i = aiui + bi in E0.
Then
v￿
i (!;E0) = aiv￿
i (!;E) + bi 8!;i = 1;2:
3. "Local" determination / IIA
Suppose S and S0 are stochastic bargaining environments and
are identical except that B0(!) ￿ B(!) 8!. If for all ! v￿(!;E) 2
B0(!) then
v￿(!;E0) = v￿(!;E) 8!
For bargaining environments E with a single threat pair (m1;m2),
the disagreement payo⁄ at state ! is denoted D(!) and is de￿ned
endogenously in terms of the solution as follows:




where v￿ is the value speci￿ed by the solution for E.
4. SYMMETRY
Suppose a bargaining environment E has a single threat pair






1 ￿ M1. Then v1(!;M0
1;M2) ￿ v1(!;M1;M2) 8!.





The ￿rst four axioms are the most familiar, as they appear in
Nash (1950) as well as Nash (1953). The ￿nal two axioms are analo-
gous to two Nash added in 1953 to handle endogenous threat points.
Axiom 5 says that a player is (weakly) strengthened by having ac-
cess to more threats. Axiom 6 says that if Player 1￿ s set of threats
is reduced to a singleton fm1g, and 2￿ s threat set is reduced to a
singleton in the most favorable way for 2, then 2 is not hurt by the
changes. This is compelling if, in some sense, threats don￿ t exert
in￿ uence "as a group" against a singleton threat of an opponent.
7. Example
8. Conclusion.
When two persons have di⁄erent preferences about how to co-
operate, what should each of them threaten to try to gain advan-
tage, and what will the ultimate outcome be? For static bargain-
ing situations, Nash (1953) proposes a solution, and presents both
axiomatic and noncooperative strategic analyses that isolate his so-
lution. We translate his results into a real-time setting, and then
allow for dynamic phenomena such as random changes in the en-
vironment, learning by doing, investment in physical and human
28capital, and so on. Our extensions of Nash￿ s axiomatic and non-
cooperative approaches agree on a unique division of surplus in a
wide class of stochastic games with contracts, and on what actions
to take to in￿ uence the outcome in one￿ s favor.
As a simple example of the strategic dynamics that can be cap-
tured, we show that a weak rival can extort a surprising amount
of money from a stronger competitor by threatening to enter the
market (even if this would be at great loss to the weaker party). If
gaining access to the market is costly to the potential entrant, the
theory o⁄ers a prediction about the optimal rate of investment in
the technology needed for entry.
Our adaptation of Nash￿ s perturbed demand game to the sto-
chastic game setting is perhaps more convincing than his original
story in the static case: when an accidental failure of bargaining
occurs (because of random perturbations), we don￿ t need to insist
that the ine¢ cient threat actions will be carried out in perpetu-
ity. Rather, they will be reconsidered when another opportunity
to bargain arises. Nonetheless, we think there is a still more plau-
sible noncooperative story that justi￿es our proposed solution. In
ongoing work we show that small behavioral perturbations of the
stochastic game lead to ￿war of attrition￿equilibria whose expected
payo⁄s coincide with those proposed here.
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